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STATUTES AND RULES 
Statutes. 
1. 70A-9-102(l)(a). 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 70A-9-
104 on excluded transactions, this chapter applies: 
(A) To any transaction (regardless of 
its form) which is intended to create a 
security interest in personal property or 
fixtures including goods, documents, 
instruments, general intangibles, chattel 
paper of accounts; and also.., 
2. Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-503. 
70A-9-503. Secured party's right to take 
possession after default. 
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party 
has on default the right to take possession of 
the collateral. In taking possession a 
secured party may proceed without judicial 
process if this can be done without breach of 
the peace or may proceed by action. ... 
3. Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-507. 
70A-9-507. Secured party/s liability for failure 
to comply with this part. 
(1) If it is established that the 
secured party is not proceeding in accordance 
with the provisions of this part, disposition 
may be ordered or restrained on appropriate 
terms and conditions. If the disposition has 
occurred, the debtor, or any person entitled 
to notification or whose security interest has 
been made known to the secured party prior to 
the disposition has a right to recover from 
the secured party any loss caused by a failure 
to comply with the provisions of this part. 
If the collateral is consumer goods, the 
debtor has a right to recover in any event an 
amount not less than the credit service charge 
plus 10% of the principal amount of the debt 
or the time/price differential plus 10% of the 
cash price. ... 
4. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 (1953). 
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78-12-40. Effect of failure of action not on 
merits. 
If any action is commenced within due 
time and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff 
is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise 
than upon the merits, and the time limited 
either by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if 
he dies and the cause of action survives, his 
representatives, may commence a new action 
within one year after the reversal or failure. 
5. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 (1986). 
78-27-56. Attorney#s fees—Award where action 
or defense in bad faith—Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall 
award reasonable attorney's fees to a pre-
vailing party if the court determines that the 
action or defense to the action was without 
merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may 
award no fees or limited fees against a party 
under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed 
an affidavit of impecuniosity in the 
action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the 
record the reason for not awarding 
fees under the provisions of 
Subsection (1). 
Rules. 
1. Rule 8(c) and (f) Utah R. Civ. P. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to 
a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth 
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, 
arbitration and award, assumption of risk, 
contributory negligence, discharge in bank-
ruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consi-
deration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow 
servant, laches, license, payment, release, 
res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense. When a party has mistakenly 
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designated a defense as a counterclaim or a 
counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, 
if justice so requires, shall treat the 
pleadings as if there had been a proper 
designation. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All 
pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
2. Rule 12(h) Utah R. Civ. P. Waiver of defenses. 
A party waives all defenses and 
objections which he does not present either by 
motion, as herein before provided or, if he 
has made no motion, in his Answer or Reply, 
except 
(1) that the defense of failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 
defense of failure to join an indispensable 
party, and the objection to state a legal 
defense to a claim may also be made by a later 
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial 
on the merits, and except 
(2) That, whenever it appears by 
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that 
the Court lacks jurisdiction of the subject 
matter, the Court shall dismiss the action. 
The objection or defense, if made at trial, 
shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) 
in the light of any evidence that may have 
been received. 
3. Rule 15(b) Utah R. Civ. P. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the 
evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleadings are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated 
in all respects as if they had been raised in 
the pleadings. Such amendments of the 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to 
conform to the evidence and to raise these 
issues may be made upon motion of any party at 
any time, even after judgment; but failure so 
to amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues. If evidence is 
objected to at the trial on the ground that it 
is not within the issues made by the 
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings 
to be amended when the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be subserved thereby 
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and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence 
would prejudice him in maintaining his action 
or defense upon the merits. The court shall 
grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable 
the objection party to meet such evidence. 
4. Rule 51 Utah. R. Civ. P. Instructions to jury; 
objection. 
At the close of the evidence or at such 
earlier time as the Court reasonably directs, 
any party may file written requests that the 
Court instruct the jury on the law as set 
forth in said request. The Court shall inform 
counsel of its proposed action upon the 
requests prior to instructing the jury; and it 
shall furnish counsel with a copy of its 
proposed instructions, unless the parties 
stipulate that such instructions may be given 
orally or otherwise waive this requirement. 
If the instructions are to be given in 
writing, all objections thereto must be made 
before the instructions are given to the jury; 
otherwise, objections may be made to the 
instructions after they are given to the jury, 
but before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict. No party may assign as error the 
giving or the failure to give an instruction 
unless he objects thereto. In objecting to 
the giving of an instruction, a party must 
state distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds for his objection. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the 
appellate Court, in its discretion and in the 
interests of justice, may review the giving of 
or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity 
shall be given to make objections, and they 
shall be made out of the hearing of the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties 
shall be made after the Court has instructed 
the jury. The Court shall not comment on the 
evidence in the case, and if the Court states 
any of the evidence, it must instruct the 
jurors that they are the exclusive judges of 
all questions of fact. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE 
On November 5, 1987, the Plaintiffs, Richard and Shirley 
Moffitt, (Moffitts) brought suit against Barr to recover the 
damages they had sustained as a result of Barr's wrongful repos-
session of their 1975 Kenworth truck. Richard Moffitt sued Barr 
for assault and battery because of an altercation which took place 
during the repossession during which Barr threatened Moffitt with 
a gun. In addition, Moffitt sued the Defendant for trespass to 
chattels, conversion, fraud, and violation of UCC Article 9, 
because he claimed a substantial interference in his ownership 
rights to the truck as a result of the repossession. 
The Plaintiff, Shirley Moffitt, sued Barr for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress for the damages she suffered as a 
result of witnessing her husband threatened with a gun. 
Barr counterclaimed with charges that the Moffitt7s Complaint 
constituted an abuse of process and also countersued the Plaintiff, 
Richard Moffitt, for assault and battery in connection with the 
altercation. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
1. The Moffitts filed their Complaint against Barr on 
November 5, 1987. As set forth above, the Moffitts claimed damages 
for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
trespass to chattels, conversion, fraud and violation of UCC 
Article 9. 
7 
2. Barr filed an Answer and Counterclaim on December 23, 
1987. Barr asserted counterclaims of assault, battery and abuse of 
process. 
3. Barr filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim on February 
26, 1988. In his Answer, Barr included various additional defenses 
but did not include the defense of "self-defense". His Counter-
claims remained the same. 
4. On January 3, 1990, the Moffitts filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Barr's Second and Third Counterclaims of assault and battery on the 
grounds that they had not been filed within the relevant statute of 
limitations. The Court ruled on Moffitts7 Motion on February 12, 
1990 and dismissed Barr's Second and Third Counterclaims 
5. On December 14, 1989, Barr filed a Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment requesting that Moffitts' fourth and fifth causes 
of action of conversion and trespass to chattels be dismissed. The 
Court granted Barr's Motion and dismissed the claims of conversion 
and trespass for chattels. 
6. The case was set for a trial by jury on June 11, 1990. 
Prior to the start of trial, the Moffitts filed a Motion in Limine 
which requested that the Court restrict Barr from producing 
evidence or argument concerning the defense of "self-defense" 
because it had not been pled in the Barr's Answer. The Moffitts' 
Motion In Limine was granted. The Court did, however, authorize 
Barr to tell his side of the story concerning the incident in 
question but did not authorize him to argue "self-defense" to the 
jury. 
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7. The case was tried before a jury on June 11, 1990 and the 
jury returned with a verdict in favor of Richard Moffitt. The jury 
awarded Moffitt compensatory damages in the amount of $7000.00 and 
punitive damages in the amount of $9000.00. After the jury had 
been released, Barr made a Motion Notwithstanding the Verdict and 
asked for a reduction of the award of punitive and compensatory 
damages. The Court denied Defendants' Motion. 
8. Judgment against Barr was entered pursuant to the jury 
verdict on June 14, 1990. Thereafter, the Defendant filed Motions 
for a New Trial, To Vacate Judgment and for Amendment of Judgment. 
All of Defendant's Motions were thereafter denied by the Court. 
9. The Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on or about 
September 24, 1990. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. During the year 1981, Richard Moffitt purchased a 1975 
Kenworth truck, VIN144540S. Moffitt used this truck as a long haul 
truck driver and the truck constituted his sole source of income. 
(Trial Transcript p. 8; Affidavit of Richard Moffitt, p. 59, Court 
file). 
2. In May or April or 1984, Mr. Moffitt leased his truck to 
Jim Jeffries and worked for him as a driver. (Trial Transcript pp. 
7-10) . 
3. During April of 1984, the engine in Moffitt's truck failed 
and necessitated repairs costing $13,000.00. (Affidavit of Richard 
Moffitt, Court file p. 59, Trial Transcript p. 21). 
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4. In order to finance the repairs, Moffitt obtained 
financial assistance from Mr, Jeffries. In order to assure the re-
payment of such assistance, Moffitt gave Jeffries the title to his 
truck to hold as security. In order to do so, Moffitt signed the 
title to Jeffries in blank. At no time did Moff itt intend or agree 
to give Jeffries his truck. (Affidavit of Richard Moffitt, Court 
file p. 60). 
5. After Moffitt had given Jeffries the title to his truck, 
Jeffries sold the truck to Chopping Motors Company in Wyoming. 
(Affidavit of Richard Moffitt, Court file p. 60). 
6. Moffitt was not aware that the truck had been sold and at 
no time had given his permission for the same. He continued in 
possession of the truck until November 5, 1984 when the Defendant 
took the truck from him. (Affidavit of Richard Moff itt p. 60, 
Trial Transcript pp. 8-11). 
7. During the period from April 1984 until November 1984, 
Moffitt drove the truck for Jeffries. During such time, Jeffries 
did not ask for the return of the truck nor did he ever tell 
Moffitt that he was not to have the truck. (Trial Transcript pp. 
11 and 12). 
8. On November 6, 1984 at approximately midnight, Barr and 
his employees came to the Moffitts' home in West Valley City with 
a wrecker truck to take the 1975 Kenworth truck from Moffitt. 
Moffitt was awakened by the noise and went outside to see what was 
happening. (Trial Transcript p. 13). 
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9. Upon leaving the house, Moffitt found that the wrecker 
operator was hooking chains to the back of his truck. Upon 
confronting the wrecker driver as to what was happening, the driver 
stated "we are taking, or repossessing, this truck". (Trial 
Transcript p. 16). 
10. At the time of the repossession, the truck had been 
parked in front of the Moffitt residence for three to four days. 
Mof f itt was in between runs and had been asked to haul another load 
that day. (Trial Transcript p. 17). 
11. Moffitt had not been informed prior to this time that his 
truck was to be taken nor did he have any notice that his truck was 
to be removed. (Trial Transcript p. 17). 
12. After Moffitt had talked with the wrecker driver, he met 
with Barr. Barr indicated that the truck was being repossessed on 
orders from Jim Jeffries. Moffitt stated that Jeffries did not own 
the truck and could not take the vehicle. In response, Barr stated 
that he had Repossession Order and showed Moffitt some papers. 
Barr also stated that he was an officer of the law and showed 
Moffitt a badge and I.D. (Trial Transcript pp. 19, 20 and 29). 
13. After Barr had shown Moffitt the alleged Repossession 
Order, Moffitt entered the driver's side of the truck and sat down 
in the driver's seat. Barr followed and climbed over the top of 
Moffitt and ended up sitting with his legs across Moffitt. 
Thereafter, he attempted to shove Moffitt out of the truck. (Trial 
Transcript pp. 24-26). 
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14. When Barr's efforts to dislodge Moffitt proved 
unsuccessful, Barr pulled a gun, cocked it, and put it to Moffitt's 
head, telling him in no uncertain words to leave the truck because 
he was not going to fight with him. (Trial Transcript pp. 25 and 
26). 
15. At the time Barr held the gun to his head, Moffitt felt 
as though he was going to be shot and was scared. Mrs. Moffitt, 
who was standing on the ground outside of the truck, was a witness 
to what was happening and went into hysterics. (Trial Transcript 
pp. 26 and 27). 
16. As a result of his wife's pleadings, Moffitt left the 
truck. At the time, Moffitt felt sick because he didn't know what 
to do. He didn't have any money and didn't have a job anymore. He 
did not sleep that night. (Trial Transcript pp. 27 and 28). 
17. Barr subsequently took the truck and left. (Trial 
Transcript pp. 27, 28). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Moffitts oppose Barr's arguments as follows: 
1. Barr waived his right to claim "self-defense". The 
District Court properly ruled on all matters touching on Barr's 
claim of self-defense. First, the Court correctly dismissed 
Barr's second and third counterclaims of assault and battery 
because they had not been timely filed. Second, the Court properly 
granted Moffitts' Motion In Limine to exclude evidence, argument 
and instructions relating to "self-defense" because Barr had failed 
to plead the same in his answer. Third, Barr's counterclaims of 
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assault and battery cannot be considered a substitute for the 
affirmative defense of "self-defense" pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because "self-defense" was not 
mistakenly pled as a counterclaim. Fourth, the Court properly 
refused to instruct the jury on "self-defense" because of Barr's 
failure to plead the same, his failure to object to the Court's 
refusal to do so after the close of evidence, and his failure to 
make a motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence as set forth 
in Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. The jury verdict was supported by substantial evidence. 
The jury properly considered Moffitt's fear, anxiety, nervous 
shock, humiliation, and injury to his personal feelings in awarding 
damages. Richard Moffitt presented substantial evidence to support 
his claim for damages and the amount awarded was not excessive or 
the result of passion or prejudice. 
3. Barr is not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
Barr cannot recover attorney fees under UCA 78-27-56 because 
the Moffitts' claims were properly grounded in law and fact and 
were not brought in bad faith. Additionally, Barr's Counterclaim 
of abuse of process was volunatrily dismissed and therefore 
prevents him from raising the issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BARR WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CLAIM •SELF-DEFENSE" 
Barr argues that the Court erred in refusing to allow him to 
advance the defense of "self-defense" and supports his argument on 
the following grounds: 
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1. The Court improperly dismissed his counterclaims of 
assault and battery; 
2. The Court improperly granted the Moffitts' Motion In 
Limine and restricted him from arguing or advancing "self-defense"; 
3. The Court erred in not allowing a "self-defense" jury 
instruction. 
As will be set forth hereafter, it was Barr himself who failed 
to properly raise "self-defense" in this case and the Moffitts 
should not be penalized for Barr's neglect. 
A. BARR'S COUNTERCLAIMS OF ASSAULT AND BATTERY WERE 
PROPERLY DISMISSED 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, the incident which 
gave rise to this action took place on November 5, 1984. 
Subsequent thereto (February 14, 1985), the Moffitts filed suit 
against Barr alleging the commission of assault, battery and other 
torts. This suit was dismissed on December 11, 1986 because of 
jurisdictional problems. At no time during the pendency of this 
first action did Barr assert his counterclaims of assault and 
battery. 
On November 5, 1987, almost one year after their prior action 
had been dismissed, the Moffitts filed the instant action. Barr 
filed counterclaims of assault and battery on December 23, 1987, 
over three years after the incident had occurred. Because the 
statute of limitations for assault and battery is one year, (UCA 
78-12-29(4)), Barr's counterclaims were clearly time barred. 
Even if the statute of limitations was stayed as Barr argues 
pursuant to the rationale set forth in Doxey-Layton Company v. 
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Clark, 548 P. 2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976), the one year statute of 
limitations would still prevent Barr from presenting his 
counterclaims because a total period of over one year had elapsed 
before Barr's claims were filed, during which there was no action 
was pending. This time period is calculated as follows: 
PERIOD ELAPSED TIME 
Date of Incident (November 5, 1984) to 101 Days 
date first action filed (February 14, 1985) 
Date First Action Dismissed (December 11, 329 Days 
1986) until present action filed (November 5, 
1987) 
TOTAL 430 Days 
1 Year 65 Days 
Based on the above, there is nothing in the law which excuses 
the Defendant's late filing. Accordingly, the Defendant's counter-
claims of assault and battery were untimely filed, and properly 
dismissed. 
B. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION IN LIMINE WAS TIMELY FILED 
AND WELL GROUNDED 
A Motion In Limine is generally made before or at the 
beginning of a jury trial for a Protective Order against pre-
judicial evidence, argument and the like. "It serves the useful 
purpose of raising and pointing out before trial certain eviden-
ciary rulings the Court may be called upon to make during the 
course of trial". Lussier v. Mau Van Development, Inc.f I, 667 
P.2d 804 (Ha. App. 1983). A Motion In Limine is addressed to the 
discretion of the Court and will not be reversed in the absence of 
an abuse of discretion. Equitable Life v. Cedarbrook, Inc., 761 
P.2d 77, 81 (Wash. App. 1988). 
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In the present case, Barr has raised two objections to the 
Moffitts7 Motion In Limine, namely, (1) that the Moffitts failed to 
object to evidence concerning "self-defense", and (2) Barr had pled 
"self-defense" in his answer - through his counterclaims of assault 
and battery. Neither of Barr's arguments can be sustained for the 
following reasons: 
1- The Moffitts timely objected to any evidence or argument 
concerning self-defense. 
In ruling on the Moffitts7 Motion In Limine, Judge Brian 
stated: 
THE COURT: The Motion In Limine, unlike other dispos-
sitive motions, may be brought at any time during the 
proceedings. The Court finds that those motions are 
routinely brought during trial, in many, many cases. 
They are designed to define issues, to expedite the legal 
proceedings, and they are appropriate at any time during 
the proceedings. 
The Court finds that the Defendant has not plead self-
defense in the Answer or other responsive pleadings. The 
Court finds that there has been ample time, from the date 
the Complaint was filed until the date of trial, to amend 
the pleadings. The Plaintiff may have been suspicious 
that a defense of self-defense would be asserted. How-
ever, failure to plead self-defense in the Defendant's 
Answer is a barr to that defense at this time. 
The Plaintiffs7 Motion In Limine to preclude the 
Defendant from presenting testimony regarding the issue 
of self-defense is granted. The Defendant is ordered not 
to produce evidence or argument concerning self-defense. 
The Defendant is certainly entitled to explain the events 
surrounding the alleged assault and battery and the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, as asserted 
by the Plaintiffs. Howeverr the issue of self-defense is 
not legally to be advanced in these proceedings, nor is 
it to be submitted to the jury by way of instruction or 
verdict form. 
MR. CASTON: Question of clarification, Your Honor. I 
would rather ask now then be instructed for a bench 
conference later. The way I understand the Court's 
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ruling, Mr. Barr may explain why he did what he did, is 
that correct? 
THE COURT: The Defendant is entitled to offer an 
explanation. Legally, there is to be no verdict form 
submitted nor jury instructions to the jury, establishing 
his behavior as a legal defense. (pps. 64-65, Trial 
Transcript). (emphasis added). 
As set forth above, the Court allowed Barr to explain the 
events surrounding the incident but was ordered not to advance the 
theory of self-defense or submit an instruction to the jury. 
Because of the Court's ruling, the Moffitts did not object to the 
testimony elicited from Barr concerning his recollection of the 
events. Furthermore, "objections need not be renewed if the prior 
ruling on the Motion In Limine amounted to an unequivocal holding 
concerning the issue raised. ... Where a hearing was held, counsel 
presented legal arguments, and the trial court ruled whether or not 
the challenged evidence would be admitted at trial, there is no 
necessity of further objection... ." Lussier, 667 P.2d 804 at 826. 
Because Judge Brian's ruling constituted an unequivocal order 
and the ruling was made after the presentation of legal arguments 
by counsel, the Moffitts were under no duty or obligation to object 
to Barr's testimony concerning the events, as seen by him. 
2. Barr waived the affirmative defense of "self-defense. 
The Court properly granted the Moffitts' Motion In Limine 
because the affirmative defense of "self-defense" had been waived. 
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "a 
party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present 
either by motion or... in his answer and reply... ." Since the 
Defendant did not plead the defense of "self-defense" in his 
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Amended Answer, it was waived. The Plaintiffs7 Motion In Limine 
was therefore a proper devise to exclude any evidence or argument 
concerning "self-defense" from the jury. (A copy of the Moffitts' 
Motion In Limine is attached as Exhibit "A"). 
3. Rule 8fc) URCP does not apply to this case. 
Barr claims that pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, he has pleaded the defense of "self-defense" by 
way of his counterclaims of assault and battery. Such an argument 
is insupportable because at the time of trial, Barr's counter-
claims were not before the Court. The counterclaims of assault and 
battery had been dismissed in April of 1990 pursuant to Moffitts' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Even if Rule 8(c) were somehow construed to be applicable to 
this case, it would not provide Barr the relief he seeks. In order 
for a counterclaim to be construed as an affirmative defense under 
Rule 8(c), it must be shown that the party mistakenly designated 
the defense as a counterclaim. A plain reading of Barr's 
counterclaims shows that Barr did not intend to plead an 
affirmative defense. The counterclaims only seek the recovery of 
damages and they do not, in any way, state or imply that Barr's 
conduct was excused by that of Richard Moffitt. Furthermore, Barr 
has not indicated that he mistakenly designated the defense of 
"self-defense" as the counter-claims of assault and battery. (A 
copy of the Defendant's Amended Answer and Counterclaim is attached 
as Exhibit "B"). 
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C. THE COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY ON WSELF-DEFENSEM 
Barr seeks to amend his Answer to include the defense of 
"self-defense" pursuant to Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 15(b) provides: "when issues not raised by the 
pleadings are tried by the express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings". (emphasis added). Contrary to Barr's 
argument, there is absolutely nothing in the record to show that 
the issue of "self-defense" was expressly or implicitly tried. The 
Moffitts' Motion In Limine and the arguments rendered in support 
thereof clearly show that the issue of self-defense was not 
expressly or implicitly triedi 
Significantly, Barr never did make a motion after the close of 
evidence to conform the pleadings to the evidence. Had he done so, 
Judge Brian would have had an opportunity to correct any errors 
before instructing the jury. In addition, Barr failed to object to 
the instructions which were given to the jury and the Court's 
failure to instruct regarding "self-defense". Pursuant to Rule 51 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "if the instructions are to 
be given in writing, all objections thereto must be made before the 
instructions are given to the jury; ...no party may assign as error 
the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects 
thereto". (emphasis added) 
As set forth in the rule, objections to instructions, or the 
Court's failure to instruct, should be made before the jury retires 
for deliberation. The purpose for this rule "is that if the 
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objections call attention to error, correction may be made before 
the jury goes to deliberate. This is the primary function of 
objections, and it is not simply to lay a foundation for possible 
reversal by the losing party.., fl. (emphasis added). Hill v. 
Cloward. 14 Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1962). The 
Defendant's failure to timely object constitutes a waiver of his 
"instruction" argument. Jensen v. Eakins, 575 P.2d 179 (Utah 
1978). 
II. THE JURY VERDICT WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
In awarding damages for assault, a jury may properly consider 
the Plaintiff's fear, anxiety, indignity, disgrace, nervous shock, 
shame, humiliation and injury to his personal feelings, among other 
things. Marbel v. Jensen, 53 Utah 226, 229, 178 P. 66 (Utah 1919); 
Dixon v. Snyder, 340 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1959). In the instant case, 
the Court properly instructed the jury on the issue of damages. 
Instruction No. 20 requests that the jury compensate the Plaintiff, 
Richard Moffitt, for any emotional distress, fear, anxiety, 
embarrassment, humiliation or loss of reputation which he 
sustained. (A copy of Instruction No. 20 is attached as Exhibit 
"C"). Contrary to Barr's argument, a substantial amount of 
evidence was presented to the jury in support of Moffitts' claim 
for damages. During his direct examination, Richard Moffitt 
testified as follows: 
Q: What did he do after coming across you? 
A: He told me he is not going to fight with me, and he 
pulled a gun from back here, and cocked it, and put 
it to my head, and told me in no uncertain words 
that he was not going to fight with me. 
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Did the gun ever touch you? 
Not that I realized, no, not that I remember. But 
it was here. 
How do you know? 
From the street light, or the light that was in the 
neighbor's yard, shines through the windows, I seen 
the flash of the gun. I knew it was an automatic. 
I knew it was cocked. I knew where he was pointing 
it. 
How do you know it was cocked? 
Because I heard it being cocked. 
* * * 
Did he touch you at any time? 
He was sitting on top of me. His legs were across me, 
trying to shove me out of the truck. My hands were on 
the steering wheel. I looked straight ahead and told him 
he was not taking the truck. My wife was outside, 
screaming to let them have it. She went hysterical 
because of the gun. I didn't want them to take my truck. 
It was mine. You don't understand it, I guess. 
You mentioned Mr. Barr had touched you, I believe 
crawling over you. Did he touch you at any other time? 
He was trying to shove me out of the truck, out of the 
seat and out the door. 
Was he doing that when he had the gun to your head? 
Yes. 
At this time, how did you feel, Richard? 
I felt I was going to get shot. 
Were you scared? 
Yes. 
Did you feel that Mr. Barr intended to make good with 
that threat? 
Yes, I did. (Trial Transcript pp. 25-27) 
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* * * 
Q: What did you do after the gun had been pulled? 
A: I just kept telling him he wasn't taking it. Fear of 
being shot and going into hysterics is — I just gave up, 
and I got out of the truck. I couldn't see her going 
through it any more. 
Q: Richard, Mr. Barr's conduct of climbing over you, pulling 
the gun, putting it to your head, was that offensive to 
you? 
A: Of course, it was. 
Q: At that time, how did you feel? What were your feelings? 
A: A little bit sick, because I didn't know what to do. I 
didn't have any money, and I didn't have a job anymore. 
Q: Did you sleep at all that night? 
A: No. 
(Trial Transcript pp. 27-28) 
The testimony was clear that as a result of having a gun 
placed at his head, the Plaintiff, Richard Moffitt, suffered fear 
for his life, loss of sleep and anxiety. All of these factors are 
properly compensable in assault cases. Barr failed to object to 
Instruction No. 20 and should not now be allowed to complain when 
the jury did as they were instructed. 
III. THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY 
FEES 
In order for Barr to be awarded attorney fees under §78-27-56 
of the Utah Code, the following matters must be established: 
1. The party awarded fees must be the prevailing party; 
2. The Court must determine that the action or defense was 
without merit; 
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3. The Court must determine that the action or defense was 
not brought in good faith. 
In the Utah case of Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, (Utah 
1983), the Utah Supreme Court defined the terms set forth in §78-
27-56 as follows: 
A. "WITHOUT MERIT": 
The term implies bordering on frivolity. The dictionary 
definition of "frivolous" is "of little weight or 
importance having no basis in law or fact". (emphasis 
added) Id. at p. 151. 
B. "GOOD FAITH" 
In addition to finding the claims to lack merit, the 
trial court must also find that Plaintiff's conduct in 
bringing suit was lacking good faith. 
In Tacoma Association of Creditmen v. Lester, 72 Wash. 2d 453, 
458; 433 P.2d 901, 904 (Wa. 1967), the Court defined "good 
faith" as: 
(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the activities 
in question; 
(2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; 
(3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the 
activities in question enter, delay or defraud others. 
To establish lack of good faith, one must prove that one or 
more of these factors is lacking. Sparkman v. McClean Company 
and Derber, 4 Wash. App. 341, 481 P.2d 585, (Wash. 1971)". 
Id. at p.151. 
In the instant case, Barr has failed to meet the standards set 
forth in Cady and §78-27-56 for the following reasons: 
1. Barr was not the prevailing party. 
Barr cannot recover his attorney fees under UCA §78-27-56 
because he was not the "prevailing party". The jury awarded 
damages in favor of Richard Moffitt, not Barr. 
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2. The Moffitts' claims were properly grounded in law and 
fact. 
The following review of the Moffitts' causes of action will 
show that they were properly grounded in law and fact. 
A. Conversion - Trespass to Chattels; 
The Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs actions for conversion 
and trespass to chattels were improper because the Defendant did 
not "own" the truck. Such causes of action, however, are well 
grounded in the law because, "the theft of goods or chattels does 
not divest one who owns, or has title to such property from his 
ownership of the property; the owner may follow and reclaim the 
stolen goods wherever he finds them." 63 Am. Jur. Property, §44. 
The sale by a thief does not vest title in the purchaser or against 
the owner even though the sale was made in the ordinary course of 
business and the purchaser acted in good faith. Eureka Springs 
Sales Company v. Ward. 226 Ark. 424, 290 S.W.2d 434. 
At trial, the Plaintiff, Richard Moffitt, testified that he 
was the owner of the truck and gave the title to Jim Jeffries as 
collateral for a loan so that his truck could be repaired. (Trial 
Transcript p. 21). He testified that he did not sell or give the 
truck to Jeffries. Because Jeffries' conduct consisted of a theft 
of the truck, Moffitt was not divested of his ownership status. In 
light of the above, Richard Moffitt certainly had a legal and 
factual basis on which to ground his assertion that he still 
"owned" the truck. 
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B. FRAUD 
Moffitts' cause of action for fraud is based on Barr's repre-
sentation that he was an officer of the law, and that he had a 
"Repossession Order". (Trial Transcript p. 29-30) Such misrepre-
sentations give factual credence to Moffitt's fraud cause of action 
and cannot be considered "frivolous". 
C. ARTICLE 9 
Section 70A-9-503, 507 of the Utah Code provides a cause of 
action against those who breach the peace when repossessing 
collateral. Contrary to Barr,s assertions, a security agreement 
does not have to be in writing to be enforceable. Section 70A-9-
102(1)(a) provides that "except as otherwise provided... this 
chapter applies to any transaction (regardless of its form) which 
is intended to create a security interest in personal property... 
11
. The Moffitt's cause of action was, therefore, well grounded in 
law and fact. 
D. BATTERY 
Both Shirley and Richard Moffitt testified that Barr drew a 
gun and held it in a very close proximity to Richard Moffitt's 
head. Testimony was also uncontroverted that there was physical 
contact leading up to the incident in which Barr drew his gun. 
(Trial Transcript p. 25-27, 57-59). Based on these facts, the 
Moffitts' allegation that the harmful and offensive touching 
occurred when the Defendant held and drew his gun at the 
Plaintiff's head was not frivolous or without legal or factual 
basis. 
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3• The Moffitts/ claims were brought in good faith. 
The most obvious reason that Barr cannot recover attorney fees 
under UCA §78-27-56 is a lack of any evidence that the Moffitts' 
lawsuit was brought in anything other than good faith. There is 
absolutely no evidence that the Moffitts brought their lawsuit 
maliciously or with the intent to defraud or take unconscionable 
advantage of Barr. The Moffitts' lawsuit, rather, is based on a 
real incident in which Barr used deadly force against the 
Plaintiff, Richard Moffitt. 
In addition, the case of Topik v. Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101 (Utah 
1987) which is cited in Barr's Brief, does not support his 
position. In Topik. the Court awarded the Plaintiff attorney fees 
because the Defendant's testimony consisted of "willful 
falsehoods". In the instant case, there is no such evidence. 
Finally, Barr's claim for attorney fees smells of hypocrisy 
because all three of his counterclaims against the Moffitts were 
dismissed by the Court and not submitted to the jury. In April of 
1990, this Court ruled that Barr's counterclaims of assault and 
battery were time barred due to the statute of limitations. In 
addition, Barr's claim of "abuse of process" was dismissed during 
trial when Barr indicated that the claim had not been seriously 
pursued. Using Barr's arguments, the Moffitts should be entitled 
to recover their attorney fees from Barr because Barr's 
counterclaims were definitely not grounded in fact. In short, Barr 
seeks relief from the Court with dirty hands and should not be 
entitled to ignore his own conduct in this litigation. 
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4. Barr's claim for attorney fees has already been dismissed. 
On January 26, 1988, Barr filed a Counterclaim for "Abuse of 
Process". In his claim, Barr alleged that the Moffitts' lawsuit 
was brought "in bad faith, without any reasonable or probable 
cause, but was brought to harass the Defendant." Barr requested 
that the Court award him his attorney fees and other damages. 
During trial, the Moffitts moved for a dismissal of the "Abuse 
of Process" claims. In response, Mr. Caston, attorney for Barr, 
stateed: "... We are not pursuing our abuse of process claim 
today." (Trial Transcript p. 127). 
Because Barr's claim for attorney fees was dismissed at trial, 
the issue of attorney fees is not proper for review. 
CONCLUSION 
The objections that Barr has raised to this proceeding were 
caused by his own fault and neglect. Barr did not plead the 
defense of self-defense, did not object when the Court failed to 
instruct the jury on this defense, did not move for an amendment of 
the pleadings to conform with the evidence and should therefore be 
barred from raising "self-defense" at this time. Contrary to his 
arguments, there was substantial evidence to support the verdict of 
the jury. The placing of a gun against another's head is not an 
incident to be taken lightly and the jury did not do so. They sent 
a message to Mr. Barr that his conduct would not be tolerated in 
our society. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower 
Court should be affirmed and Defendant's appeal dismissed. 
27 
<& DATED this ^ i day of April, 1991. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
'"juke* 
^ JAMES B. HANKS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MOFFITT and SHIRLEY 
MOFFITT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT E. BARR, dba AMERICAN 
RECOVERY SERVICE, 
Defendants. 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
Case No. 870907265CV 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, James B. 
Hanks of Kipp and Christian, P.C, move the Court for an 
Order requiring the Defendant to limit the testimony in 
his case to those matters which will support the defenses 
set forth in his answer, and no others. In particular, 
the Defendant should not be entitled to produce evidence 
or argument concerning self-defense because it was not 
pled in Defendants answer. A copy of Defendants answer 
is attached as Exhibit "A". 
DATED this / ^  day of June, 1990. 
'tt^y-hj^ 
Fumes B. Hanks 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Motion in Limine, was hand-delivered on 
the J*-" day of June, 1990, to the following: 
Harry Caston, Esq. 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
PETER STIRBA (3118) 
R. BRET JENKINS (5094) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MOFFITT and SHIRLEY : 
MOFFITT, 
: ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
: Civil No. C87-07265 
ROBERT E. BARR dba AMERICAN 
RECOVERY SERVICE, : 
Defendant. : 
The Defendant, Robert Barr, by and through his 
attorney of record, answer Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for which relief 
can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The Defendant answers the Plaintiffs' numbered 
allegations listed in their Complaint as follows: 
2. The Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to 
form an opinion as to the allegations in paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
Plaintiffs' Complaint and therefore denies. 
3. The Defendant admits the allegations contained in 
paragraph 3 of the Complaint. 
4. The Defendant denies the allegations in paragraphs 
4 and 5 of the Complaint. 
5. The Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to 
form an opinion as to the allegations in paragraph 6 of the 
Complaint and therefore denies. 
6. The Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the 
Plaintiffs f Complaint. 
7. The Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to 
form an opinion as to the allegation in paragraph 19 that 
Shirley Moffitt is the wife of the Plaintiff Richard Moffitt, 
and therefore denies. 
8. The Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 19 
of Plaintiffs1 Complaint. 
9. The Defendant denies the allegations in paragraphs 
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 of the 
Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
10. The Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44 
of the Plaintiffs1 Complaint. 
11. The Defendant denies any other allegations not 
expressly admitted to in this Answer. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
The Defendant affirmatively alleges as follows: 
12. The Plaintiffs1 claims against the Defendant are 
meritless and not brought in good faith. 
13. The Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees under 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56• 
FIRST COUNTERCLAIM 
(Abuse of Process) 
14. The Plaintiffs originally initiated criminal 
proceedings against the Defendant based on the same facts as 
exist in this action. 
15. The Defendant was ultimately cleared of each of 
the charges. 
16. The Plaintiffs then filed a civil lawsuit against 
the Defendant in September of 1986 in Third District Court based 
on the same facts. 
17. On December 1, 1986, the Honorable Judge Richard 
Moffat dismissed the lawsuit. 
18. On or about November 5, 1987, the Plaintiffs filed 
the present Complaint based on the same facts as existed in the 
prior criminal action and civil suit and caused the Defendant to 
be served with a Summons and copy of the Complaint on December 
2, 1987. 
19. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendant 
wrongfully took a certain 1975 Kenworth truck, and in the 
process, committed an assault, battery and other violations. 
20. The present lawsuit was brought by the Plaintiffs 
in bad faith, without any reasonable or probable cause, but was 
brought to harass the Defendant. 
21. In bringing the lawsuit, the Plaintiffs acted 
maliciously and with intent to injure the Defendant by harming 
his good name and reputation through the use of the judicial 
system. 
22. The actions of the Plaintiffs constitute an abuse 
of the judicial system. 
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM 
(Assault) 
23. The Defendant had been hired to repossess a 1975 
Kenworth Tractor from the Plaintiff. 
24. On or about November 5, 1984, the Defendant, 
Robert Barr, was attempting to repossess the Tractor, which was 
located in front of the Plaintiffs' home. 
25. During the procedure, the Defendant was sitting in 
the front driver's seat of the Tractor, and the Plaintiff, 
Richard Moffitt, approached the Defendant in a violent and angry 
manner, yelling at the Defendant that he was going to kill him. 
26. The act by the Plaintiff of approaching the 
Defendant in an angty, violent manner, while yelling that he was 
going to "kill him,f created reasonable apprehension and fear in 
the Defendant of immediate harmful contact with his person. 
27. The Plaintiff's actions were intended by him to 
place the Defendant in apprehension and fear of immediate, 
harmful contact. 
28. The acts of the Plaintiff caused the Defendant, 
Robert Barr, severe emotional trauma and fear for his life for 
which the Plaintiff has suffered irreparable damage. 
THIRD COUNTERCLAIM 
(Battery) 
29. While the Defendant, Robert Barrf was sitting in 
the front seat of the tractor. The Plaintiff brought about a 
harmful and offensive contact with the Defendant's person when 
he climbed onto the running board of the truck and physically 
knocked the Defendant out of the seat. 
30. The Plaintiff's actions were intended to bring 
about a harmful and offensive contact upon the Defendant. 
31. The act of the Plaintiff, Richard Moffitt, in 
knocking the Defendant out of the driver's seat caused the 
Defendant extreme emotional distress and fear for his life and 
caused the Defendant irreparable damages. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for relief as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs1 action be dismissed. 
2. Defendant be awarded a sum of money for general 
and special damages for the three counterclaims, in an amount to 
be determined at trial. 
3. Defendant be awarded punitive damages for each 
counterclaim in the ^ amount of $50,000.00. 
A. Defendant be awarded costs and attorney's fees 
associated with this lawsuit. 
5. For other appropriate relief the Court deems just 
and equitable. 
J 
DATED this V> day of December, 1987. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
PETER STIRBA 
R. BREJ JfiNKINS 
A t t o m e y ^ f o r Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to James B. Hanks, Esq., Gateway Park, Suite 300, 563 West 500 
South, Bountiful, Utah, this ^ 3 — day of December, 1987. 
/ 
Third Juaicia* Dis^ict 
JAMES B. HANKS (A4331) 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
CITY CENTRE I , #330 
175 EAST 4 0 0 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84I I I -23 I * 
(SOI) 521-3773 
Attorney for P la in t i f f s 
JUN 1 2 1990 
Depur/ Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MOFFITT and SHIRLEY 
MOFFITT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ROBERT E. BARR, dba AMERICAN 
RECOVERY SERVICE, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
IN LIMINE 
Case No. 870907265CV 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
This matter having come before the Court on the 
12th day of June, 1990 pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion in 
Limine. The Court, having heard argument from counsel 
and being fully informed in the premises, orders the 
Defendant to limit the presentation of evidence and argument 
in his case to those matters concerning the defenses pled 
in his answer. In particular, the Defendant is ordered 
not to produce evidence respecting the defense of 
self-defense. 
DATED this day of June, 1990. 
PAT B. BRIAN 
District Court Judge 
CHRISTIAN. PC. 
INEYS AT LAW 
NTRE I , # 3 3 0 
>T 4 0 0 SOUTH 
LAKE CITY, 
I 8*m-23l<4 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order Granting Motion in Limine was 
hand-delivered on the day of June, 1990 to the 
following: 
Harry Caston, Esq. 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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PETER STIRBA (3118) 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1200 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone (801) 521-4135 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MOFFITT and SHIRLEY 
MOFFITT, AMENDED 
: ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
: Civil No. C87-07265 
ROBERT E. BARR dba AMERICAN Judge Pat B. Brian 
RECOVERY SERVICE, : 
Defendant. : 
Defendant Robert E. Barr answers Plaintiffs' Complaint 
as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for which relief can 
be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The Defendant answers the Plaintiffs' numbered alle-
gations listed in their Complaint as follows: 
1. The Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to 
form an opinion as to the allegations in paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
Plaintiffs' Complaint and therefore denies. 
2. The Defendant admits the allegations contained in 
paragraph 3 of the Complaint. 
3. The Defendant denies the allegations in paragraphs 
4 and 5 of the Complaint. 
4. The Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to 
form an opinion as to the allegations in paragraph 6 of the 
Complaint and therefore denies. 
5. The Defendant denies the allegations of paragraphs 
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the Plain-
tiffs1 Complaint. 
6. The Defendant is without sufficient knowledge to 
form an opinion as to the allegation in paragraph 19 that 
Shirley Moffitt is the wife of the Plaintiff Richard Moffitt, 
and therefore denies. 
7. The Defendant denies the remainder of paragraph 19 
of Plaintiffs1 Complaint. 
8. The Defendant denies the allegations in paragraphs 
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 of the Plain-
tiffs ? Complaint. 
9. The Defendant denies the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44 
of the Plaintiffs1 Complaint. 
10. The Defendant denies any other allegations not 
expressly admitted to in this Answer. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs1 claims are barred under the doctrine of res 
judicia. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims are barred under the doctrine of laches. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs1 claims should be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs1 claims against the Defendant are meritless 
and not brought in good faith and Defendant is entitled to 
attorney's fees under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Under Utah Code Annotated §78-12-29, Plaintiffs1 claims 
for assault and battery are barred by statute of limitations. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff claims under their third and seventh causes of 
action are barred by Section 78-12-26 U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs have no standing to bring claims for tres-
pass to chattels and conversion since Plaintiffs did not own or 
have a possessory right in the vehicle which was repossessed. 
FIRST COUNTERCLAIM 
(Abuse of Process) 
1. The Plaintiffs originally initiated criminal 
proceedings against the Defendant based on the same facts as 
exist in this action. 
2. The Defendant was ultimately cleared of each of 
the charges. 
3. The Plaintiffs then filed a civil lawsuit against 
the Defendant in February of 1985 in Third District Court based 
on the same facts. 
4. On December 1, 1986, the Honorable Judge Richard 
Moffat dismissed the lawsuit. 
5. On or about November 5, 1987, the Plaintiffs filed 
the present Complaint based on the same facts as existed in the 
prior criminal action and civil suit and caused the Defendant to 
be served with a Summons and copy of the Complaint on December 
2, 1987. 
6. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendant wrong-
fully took a certain 1975 Kenworth truck, and in the process, 
committed an assault, battery and other violations. 
7. The present lawsuit was brought by the Plaintiffs 
in bad faith, without any reasonable or probable cause, but was 
brought to harass the Defendant. 
8. In bringing the lawsuit, the Plaintiffs acted 
maliciously and with intent to injure the Defendant by harming 
his good name and reputation through the use of the judicial 
system. 
9. The actions of the Plaintiffs constitute an abuse 
of the judicial system, are willful, wanton and malicious and in 
reckless disregard of Defendant's rights and Defendant should be 
awarded punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM 
(Assault) 
10. The Defendant had been hired to repossess a 1975 
Kenworth Tractor from the Plaintiff. 
11. On or about November 5, 1984, the Defendant, 
Robert Barr, was attempting to repossess the Tractor, which was 
located in front of the Plaintiffs1 home. 
12. During the procedure, the Defendant was sitting in 
the front driver's seat of the Tractor, and the Plaintiff, 
Richard Moffitt, approached the Defendant in a violent and angry 
manner, yelling at the Defendant that he was going to kill him. 
13. The act by the Plaintiff of approaching the 
Defendant in an angry, violent manner, while yelling that he was 
going to "kill him,r created reasonable apprehension and fear in 
the Defendant of immediate harmful contact with his person. 
14. The Plaintiff's actions were intended by him to 
place the Defendant in apprehension and fear of immediate, 
harmful contact. 
15. The acts of the Plaintiff caused the Defendant, 
Robert Barr, severe emotional trauma and fear for his life for 
which the Plaintiff has suffered general and special damages. 
16. As a result of Plaintiff's willful, wanton and 
malicious conduct, Defendant should be compensated in punitive 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
THIRD COUNTERCLAIM 
(Battery) 
17. While the Defendant, Robert Barr, was sitting in 
the front seat of the tractor. The Plaintiff brought aboutva 
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harmful and offensive contact with the Defendant's person when 
he climbed onto the running board of the truck and physically 
knocked the Defendant out of the seat. 
18. The Plaintiff's actions were intended to bring 
about a harmful and offensive contact upon the Defendant. 
19. The act of the Plaintiff, Richard Moffitt, in 
knocking the Defendant out of the driver's seat caused the 
Defendant extreme emotional distress and fear for his life and 
caused the Defendant general and special damages. 
20. As a result of Plaintiff's willful, wanton and 
malicious conduct, Defendant should be compensated in punitive 
damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for relief as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' action be dismissed. 
2. Defendant be awarded a sum of money for general 
and special damages for the three counterclaims, in an amount to 
be determined at trial. 
3. Defendant be awarded punitive damages for each 
counterclaims in the amount of $100,000.00. 
4. Defendant be awarded costs and attorney's fees 
associated with this lawsuit. 
5. For other appropriate relief the Court deems just 
and equitable. 
DATED this day of January, >M88. 
McKAYJ_BURTONI & \THURMAN 
By 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to James B. Hanks, Esq., Gateway Park, Suite 300, 563 
West 500 South, Bountiful, Utah, this (J$^ day of January, 
1988. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
If you find in favor of the Plaintiff Richard Moffit, on 
any of he* claims, then you must assess her damages which may be 
actual or nominal. 
To assess any actual damages, you must find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff sustained 
actual damages as a proximate result of the claimed assault 
and/or battery. 
To the extent that any actual damages have been so 
established by the evidence, you shall assess as the Plaintiffs 
actual damages, an amount which will fairly and justly 
compensate him for: 
1. Any physical discomfort or inconveniences she may 
have sustained; 
2. Any physical illness or injury she may have sustained; 
3. Any emotional distress, fear, anxiety, embarrassment, 
humiliation or loss of reputation she may have 
